Early warnings surrounding the Strait of Hormuz suggested that European airports and fuel markets could face physical shortages by the beginning of summer. Those shortages largely failed to materialise, revealing both the adaptability of global energy markets and their persistent tendency to price worst-case scenarios long before they occur. When the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed at the end of February, the first forecasts were dramatic.

The disruption affected a route that had carried nearly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products before the conflict, while Gulf exporters had also supplied a significant share of the world’s diesel, jet fuel and liquefied petroleum gas. Europe appeared particularly exposed because it imported far more aviation fuel than it produced and had relied heavily on supplies originating in the Middle East. By April, warnings of physical shortages were becoming increasingly specific.

The International Energy Agency estimated that Europe could begin running short of aviation fuel in June if it managed to replace only half of the supplies normally imported from the Gulf. Airlines warned that flights might have to be cancelled, airports considered contingency measures, and European officials began discussing the coordinated release and redistribution of jet fuel reserves. Ryanair suggested that a loss of 10% to 20% of available supply could force airlines to cut capacity during the summer season.

June has now passed, however, and European aviation has not ground to a halt. Petrol stations have not broadly run dry, diesel rationing has not been introduced and the widespread physical shortages that dominated the early discussion have not occurred. Prices increased sharply, inventories declined and individual routes became less economical, but the energy system absorbed a disruption that the IEA described as the largest in the history of the global oil market.

Related: Europe's Heatwave Is Becoming an Energy Crisis That outcome deserves more attention because it reveals something important about how energy crises are discussed. Markets are exceptionally good at identifying vulnerability, but they often treat exposure as though it were the same thing as inevitable collapse. A Severe Disruption That Did Not Produce the Expected Shortage The scale of the Hormuz shock should not be understated.

At its worst, around 14 million barrels per day of oil supply were disrupted, equivalent to approximately 14% of global demand. Middle Eastern exports of refined products largely disappeared, several refineries and gas-processing facilities were shut down, and producers curtailed output because they could no longer export it or had nowhere to store it. Jet fuel appeared to be one of Europe’s weakest points.

The continent consumes roughly 1.6 million barrels per day of jet fuel and kerosene but produces closer to 1.1 million barrels per day, leaving a substantial structural import requirement. Before the conflict, most of those imports came from the Middle East. By April, shipments loaded in the region had essentially stopped, while stocks in major trading hubs were falling towards historically low levels.